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Abstract: This article explores how race and gender
become distinguished from each other in contempor-
ary scholarly and activist debates on the comparison
between transracialism and transgender identities.
The article argues that transracial-transgender dis-
tinctions often reinforce divides between autological
(self-determined) and genealogical (inherited) aspects
of subjectivity and obscure the constitution of this
division through modern technologies of power.
Keywords: transracialism; gender identity; autology
Introduction: Two Scenes ofTransgender
Recognition
Let me begin with a scene that might seem quite re-
moved from the North American debate on “transra-
cialism” and the highly contested (dis)analogy
between transgender and transrace identities1 . In late
2016, the Indian government introduced a bill on
transgender rights titled the Transgender Persons (Pro-
tection ofRights) Bill 2016. The bill attracted many
criticisms from transgender activists in India. Many
activists strongly protested the bill’s decree (later re-
vised) that people would need to be certified by “dis-
trict screening committees,” including psychiatrists,
to be legally recognized as transgender (Orinam
2016) . However, activists have been divided on the
issue of what should take the place of such screening
committees. Some activist collectives lobbied for a
fully self-determined process through which trans
people should be able to legally change their gender
to male, female, or transgender/other, sans screening
and irrespective of transition (THITS 2016) . Other
trans activists worried that without a screening pro-
cess altogether, cisgender people could claim to be
trans to gain welfare measures. Among them, some
expressed concern that the inclusion of “genderqueer”
within the transgender category in the bill might be
misused by gay or lesbian people to claim trans iden-
tification, thus excluding underprivileged trans
people truly deserving of welfare (Dutta 2016) . This
is a particularly fraught question given that many
South Asian gender-variant communities like kothis,
dhuranis, and hijras include a spectrum of people, in-
cluding those who might be described in Anglophone
terms as feminine same-sex-desiring men, trans wo-
men, and people with fluid or overlapping subject
positions, thus defying neat cis-trans binaries (Dutta
and Roy 2014) . In that context, the recognition of
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(POC) voices that quickly rebuffed comparisons
between Diallo’s identity and trans narratives, writing,
“the fundamental difference between Dolezal’s actions
and trans people’s is that her decision to identify as
black was an active choice, whereas transgender
people’s decision to transition is almost always invol-
untary. . . . Dolezal identified as black, but I am a
woman, and other trans people are the gender they
feel themselves to be” (2015) . Talusan thus backtracks
from her previous statement about her womanhood as
a consciously self-determined identification rather
than an unchanging essence: now gender is posited as
an involuntary, static and inherent aspect of sub-
jectivity.
The striking contrast between Talusan’s former and
latter statements is symptomatic of the anxieties sur-
rounding trans recognition at a moment when “trans-
gender” is being increasingly absorbed into liberal
regimes of governance and mainstream forms of cul-
tural representation around the world. As the brief
comparison between the Indian and US contexts in-
dicates, the transnational spurt in trans visibility
prompts a tense reckoning with the implications of
trans recognition and whom it might legitimately en-
compass or not. The controversy around Diallo’s
claims demonstrates how the stakes of the govern-
mental and social recognition of transgender identit-
ies extend well beyond the specific case of gender.
Indeed, the increasing incorporation of trans identit-
ies into liberal governance regimes, coupled with me-
dia visibility, has positioned transgender narratives as
paradigmatic models for various forms of identifica-
tion that go against social assignment. As Susan
Stryker (2015) says regarding the transgender-trans-
race analogy:
Perhaps the very first question to pose here is
how discourses and narratives rooted in trans-
gender history and experience have come to
supply a master story for other kinds of bodily
transformations. . . . How is it that transgender
stories have become well known enough, relat-
ive to other claims of identity transformation,
to function as the better-known half of the
pair?
“transgender” as a legal category invested with rights
and benefits spurs anxieties on part of both the state
and communities regarding the proper subjects of
such recognition.
Cut to the United States, where the increasing repres-
entation of trans identities in mainstream media and
culture has been hailed as a “transgender tipping
point” (Penny 2014) . In April 2015, even as this mo-
ment was unfolding in US popular culture, trans
writer Meredith Talusan was interviewed for an article
in the now-defunct feminist website The Toast, where
she was asked about her conception of gender iden-
tity and selfhood. Talusan departed from common
narratives of transgender identity as innately determ-
ined from childhood, and provided a nuanced ac-
count of how she came to identify as a woman
informed by both her subjective traits and her so-
ciocultural context:
I’m not the type of woman who believes that
there is something unchanging about me that
makes me a woman. Mainly, I’m a woman be-
cause there are huge parts ofme that have come
to be coded in this culture as feminine, and
that this culture makes so difficult to express
unless I identify as a woman. Even when I
identified as a gay man, I felt so much pressure
to be masculine . . . and I was only allowed to
be feminine as a parody. . . . So to be the kind
of feminine I wanted to be in this culture, I felt
the need to identify as a woman and I don’t re-
gret that decision because women are awesome.
(Jerkins 2015)
Later that year, the “transgender tipping point” took
an unexpected turn when controversy erupted over
the racial identity of Nkechi Amare Diallo (formerly
known as Rachel Dolezal) , who was exposed as hav-
ing white parentage after years of representing herself
as black (Koerner and Dalrymple 2015) . Several
commentators, including Diallo herself, described her
claim to blackness as analogous to trans people’s
claims to be a different gender relative to their social
gender assignment (Allen 2015) . In this context,
Talusan joined a chorus of trans and people-of-colour
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In response to the invocation of transgender as a le-
gitimizing narrative for transracialism, many journal-
ists, scholars, and activists have responded by
insisting not only that race and gender identity oper-
ate in fundamentally different ways, but also that the
transgender-transrace analogy perpetuates harm on
people who are oppressed in gendered or racial terms.
For instance, Samantha Allen (2015) argues that un-
like gender, racial transition is simply not possible
except as an exercise in cultural appropriation and
white privilege. She goes on to aver that Diallo’s at-
tempt “to pass as someone whose identity deserves
respect on the same grounds as transgender people . .
. has the potential to do real damage to public per-
ceptions and conceptions of transgender identity.” In
the academic context, transrace-transgender analogies
have been critiqued as abstract theoretical exercises
that ignore the material lived experiences and know-
ledges of trans people and POC, as was suggested by
the open letter to Hypatia asking for the retraction of
Rebecca Tuvel’s 2017 article “In Defense of Transra-
cialism” (Open Letter 2017) . In a review of Rogers
Brubaker’s book Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of
Unsettled Identities, C. Ray Borck says:
In Tuvel’s case as in Brubaker’s, just because it
is conceptually possible to cull a logic from the
most banal of pop-cultural encounters with
transgender and apply it to a sociologically
nonexistent thing called transrace doesn’t mean
that doing so produces any kind of knowledge
illuminating actual gendered or raced lives,
histories, material realities. . . . Even if we are
in a moment in which transrace is emerging as
an identity category . . . I maintain that our
best methods for understanding what it is or
means will not be best produced by taking
transgender as the point of departure or com-
parison. (2017, 684)
In this context, it is perhaps germane to reframe
Stryker’s question as such: What is at stake in dissoci-
ating transgender from such analogical uses, in not
letting it be a referential narrative for other, more
controversial, identity claims? If on one side trans-
gender emerges as a “master story” invoked for the
validation of what is currently socially unacceptable,
on the other, trans is sought to be maintained as a
sacrosanct narrative of ontologically valid identifica-
tion that should not be contaminated through com-
parison with “sociologically nonexistent” phenomena.
This ignores how transgender has not always been a
sociologically validated or legible category. As Adolph
Reed (2015) puts it, “transgender wasn’t always a
thing—just ask Christine Jorgensen.” Further, as the
contested inclusion of genderqueer within the trans-
gender category in India suggests, not all trans iden-
tity claims are likely to be treated the same, and some
are more sacrosanct than others, depending on factors
like conformity to a binary transitional narrative or
lack thereof. The deeper issue, then, is to parse the
conditions of legibility that permit identity claims to
be recognized as valid or not, particularly in the
realms of critical scholarly and activist discourse.
I here draw inspiration from trans and POC scholars
who have cautioned both against analogical confla-
tions of transrace and transgender, and against some
of the ways in which the transrace-transgender ana-
logy is shut down. As Kai M. Green says, simply say-
ing that “race and gender are not the same” might
serve to re-naturalize gender such that “transgender
can become a category that we take for granted”
(2015) . Paisley Currah (2015) notes that some at-
tempts to shut down the transrace-transgender com-
parison reduce “trans politics and claims to identity”
to the “most simple minded versions of trans essen-
tialism.” A comment underneath Stryker’s aforemen-
tioned post (2015) provides a neat example: transrace
and transgender are “not comparable . . . [because]
trans is an actual medical condition. These people
have different hormones in their body that cause
them to feel like the other gender.” Such claims are
part of a biologically deterministic etiology or causal
narrative of gender identity that is widely prevalent in
both the medical establishment and popular culture.
Indeed, transgender legibility in the mainstream has
been often premised on the etiology of a predeter-
mined brain sex that manifests itself through anatom-
ical dysphoria right from one’s childhood, which
serves to maintain a deeply biologized ontology of
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gender (Tannehill 2013) . It is this kind of an etiology
and ontology that Diallo sometimes evokes to validate
her “transracial” identity based on an innate racial
disidentification with whiteness from her childhood,
but far less successfully (Kim 2015) .
However, it is not only biological essentialists who
have bristled at transgender-transrace analogies; in-
deed, many critics position themselves against the
biological determinism of both race and gender, and
rather locate their objections in the dissimilar so-
ciohistorical constructions and lived experiences of
these categories. For instance, race is understood as a
more recent colonial construction that functions more
as an externally imposed taxonomy rather than deep
subjective identification (Anderson 2017), whereas
gender is apparently an older, more cross-cultural
construct, and a more essential part of core selfhood
(Talusan 2015) . However, as suggested by Talusan’s
oscillation between essentialist and non-essentialist
understandings of gender identity, I contend that
commentators have not always been transparent
about their own role in such processes of construc-
tion. That is to say, transrace-transgender distinctions
are not merely attempts to understand external social
realities but actively work to construct race and
gender in ways that merit further exploration.
In particular, I am interested in how the relation
between socially assigned categories, material position
within hierarchies of privilege, and subjective identi-
fication is understood in different ways for different
identity claims. I would argue that a key reason for
the discomfort with transrace-transgender analogies
lies precisely in the way that gender identity has been
de-essentialized and the aspects of social position and
subjective identity have been delinked from each oth-
er through critical discourses and activist struggles.
Gender has been individualized, interiorized, and dis-
sociated from both biological and social determinism
to a greater degree relative to other axes of identity,
permitting ontological justifications of gender iden-
tity that are not based on fulfilling external material
criteria. In that regard, the dissociation of transgender
and transrace narratives serves as an allegory that
might help us to parse the contemporary reconstruc-
tion of gender in contrast to other forms of identific-
ation. With reference to Elizabeth Povinelli’s
analytical distinction between “autology” and “genea-
logy” (2006), I specifically examine the constitution
of gender as both ontologically deeper and more
autological or self-determined relative to the genealo-
gical determination of race. The attempt to examine
how this division is constituted in contemporary dis-
courses on transracialism is not to adjudicate transrace
identity claims as valid or otherwise, nor to lay out an
abstract theory of race and gender over the lived
struggles of racially or gender marginalized people. It
is rather to tease out what becomes taken for granted
in our affective and intellectual responses to the
transrace versus transgender question.
On Materiality and Identity
While the historical dynamics and social materialities
of race and gender are undeniably different, there is at
least one common question at stake in debates about
racial and gender identity claims. This is the relation
between social position in its material and experiential
aspects (the lived experiences and privileges/dispriv-
ileges resulting from one’s placement within socially
assigned categories) and subjective identification. In
which cases does a distinction between social position
and subjective identity become not only analytically
useful, but also politically acceptable? This is a ques-
tion that turns up, for instance, in debates about trans
women having allegedly experienced male privilege,
or about Diallo’s white privilege in relation to her
claim to blackness.
Rather than tackling this question with reference to
race or gender right away, it might be illuminating to
begin from an analytical and political category that
has been rather neglected in the debates on transra-
cialism: class. In the predominant genealogy of class
critique that comes to us via Marxist theory, class is
glossed as a collective relation to the social means of
production (Marx and Engels 1945) . In the Marxist
framework, it would make no sense to self-identify as
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a particular class, especially when one’s subjective
identity is at odds with social position. For instance,
in the US context, many rich people say that they are
middle class (Frank 2015) . However, for the purposes
of political economic analysis, only change in one’s
material circumstances would correspond to a valid
change in class position. Since the very definition of
class is in terms of an external position within so-
cioeconomic relations, one could argue that it is a
materially determined category and not an individu-
alized identity at all, even though that is how it is of-
ten glossed in American intersectionality speak.
If the evocation of class seems a bit far-fetched in this
discussion, it would be instructive to recall that some
versions of radical feminism have indeed conceptual-
ized gender in terms of class relations: one’s relation
to the biological means of reproduction determines
the sex class that one is socially placed within at birth
(Firestone 1970) . Contemporary TERFism, or trans
exclusive radical feminism, extends such arguments
to deny the validity of transgender identities. One’s
sex class is seen as an immutable socially determined
reality, resulting in a rigid binary division of privilege
and disempowerment: there is no subjective reality to
gender; rather gender is merely an ideological con-
struct that keeps the sex classes intact. Therefore,
subjective gender identification is not valid, and trans
identity serves to deny the material determination of
assigned sex (Barrett 2016) . In practice, this means
that trans women deserve to be exposed as bearers of
male privilege and non-binary people simply cannot
exist.
Activist and academic discourses have powerfully re-
futed such a deterministic materialism of sex/gender.
More mainstream trans discourses have done this by
positing an alternative form of material determina-
tion through essentialist etiologies such as brain sex
which prompt and justify bodily transition, thus bio-
logically and socially dissociating trans people from
their socially assigned gender (Tannehill 2013) . The
deep ontological reality of trans women as women,
and their anatomical transition to their authentic self,
dissociates them from male privilege (Thom 2015) .
However, recent trans activism has moved away from
biologized etiological and ontological narratives
hinged on bodily transition. Trans activist-academic
discourses have increasingly shown that the material-
ity of gender as both socially perceived and subject-
ively lived is often contextually changeable,
intersectional and non-binary, rather than materially
determined into rigidly binary social classes. For in-
stance, trans feminist Kat Callahan (2013) posits the
idea of “provisional male privilege”: privilege does not
simply follow from having male-assigned bodies, but
rather is linked to the performance of hegemonic
masculinity, which often excludes trans and queer
people. Indeed, the co-constitution of gender with
class and race means that even cisgender maleness is
not always a privilege in itself and some cis men
might end up having less privilege than elite women,
as evident in the persecution and criminalization of
Black men and masculinities through the US carceral
complex.
Further, trans activists and scholars have also increas-
ingly forwarded a distinction between subjective
identification and the presence or absence of gendered
privileges. This became particularly apparent after the
famed feminist author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie
(2017) made statements about all trans women hav-
ing had male privilege at some point in their lives.
Some trans feminists like Jen Richards (2017) went
beyond the defense against the charge of male priv-
ilege, and pointed out that trans women, like any
other gendered group, may have very different narrat-
ives and histories of gender (dis)privilege. While some
trans women experience little or no male privilege due
to early visibility or transition, others like Caitlyn
Jenner and Richards herself have grappled with male
privilege for much of their lives, both benefitting
from and suffering due to their social assignment as
upper-class white males. Irrespective of the degree of
privilege, however, material position is not seen as the
determinant of their identity both before and after
transition.
Indeed, the role of bodily transition and social passing
is also increasingly downplayed relative to self-identi-
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fication in trans discourses. As Asher Bauer (2010)
says, “sex is as much a social construct as gender, as
much subject to self identification . . . while (ana-
tomical) modifications may be necessary for our
peace ofmind, they are not necessary to make us ‘real
men’ or ‘real women’ or ‘real’ whatevers.” Moreover,
the proliferation of genderqueer and non-binary dis-
courses have foregrounded ever more fluid configura-
tions of subjective identity and gender expression.
Trans advocates on popular feminist websites like
Everyday Feminism have argued that genderqueer
people need not look androgynous, and presentation
as cisgender need not coincide with cis identification
(Reading 2014) . In diametrical opposition to the ma-
terialist determination of sex advanced by TERFs,
such advocates argue that gender should be neither
defined by anatomy nor by looks or dress, but rather,
only by how one identifies: gender identity is posited
as entirely self-determined and need not meet any ex-
ternal social criteria (Micah 2015) .
This tendency is also evidenced in the aforemen-
tioned Indian debate over transgender rights legisla-
tion. Some activists have advocated a dual system of
recognition where legal gender identity as male, fe-
male, or other is based entirely on self-attestation,
without having to fulfill external criteria of transition.
However, to access benefits from the state, one has to
be vetted by committees led by community members
who would presumably take factors such as gender
expression, caste, and class into account (THITS
2016) . The distinction between legal identity and
certification for benefits carries the privilege-identity
distinction to its logical conclusion, and seeks to
formalize it into legal procedure: the state cannot ad-
judicate identity claims based on external assessments
of social identity or position, but the lived experience
of (dis)privilege remains a valid consideration for ac-
cessing benefits.
There is a stark contrast between the disaggregation
of self-identification and external material position in
the case of gender and the deterministic approach to
racial identity in progressive spaces. While race is
commonly acknowledged to be sociohistorically con-
structed, it seems to function as a materially determ-
ined reality akin to class in Marxist political economy,
where any valid sense of subjective identity can only
follow from the social predetermination of one’s racial
position. As Zeba Blay says, “racial divisions may ul-
timately be a construct . . . but ‘skin color is heredit-
ary.’ And it's skin color that primarily determines
racial privilege” (2015) . Further, unlike the case of
class, where agential economic mobility is possible,
the material determination of race is typically as-
sumed to be fixed; any transformation in racial posi-
tion does not seem to be feasible, and any attempted
change can be seen only as dissimulation. This is ap-
parent in a stream of commentary on Diallo which
sees her actions as always perpetuating white privilege,
which remains immutable irrespective of anything
that she might do (Blay 2015; Millner 2017) . As Blay
puts it, “transracial identity . . . allows white people to
indulge in blackness as a commodity, without having
to actually engage with every facet of what being
black entails . . . Dolezal retains her privilege; she can
take out the box braids and strip off the self-tanner
and navigate the world without the stigma tied to ac-
tually being black” (2015) . In the academic context,
Kris Sealey disagrees with Rebecca Tuvel’s contention
that Diallo’s actions might amount to a “renunciation
of white privilege” (2017, 271 ) ; Sealey instead reiter-
ates that “Dolezal’s decision to reject her privilege . . .
ultimately affirms that privilege in her very decision
to reject it (the privilege lies in having the option to
say ‘yes’ or ‘no’)” (2018, 26) . Both Blay and Sealey
underline that such an option is typically not available
to black people, and that transition from black to
white is often much more fraught and risk-laden, as
evidenced in historical cases of black people passing as
white for survival.
My point here is not to defend Diallo’s identity claims
against charges of white privilege, nor to deny that
the variable access to racial transition and “passing” is
contingent on social privileges or lack thereof (which
is also true of gendered transition in a different sense,
where class and economic ability often determine
both the access to and the quality of transitional
treatments) . There are certainly points where Diallo’s
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self-representations seem liable to the charge of priv-
ileged opportunism; for instance, Diallo seems to
have previously claimed discrimination based on
whiteness (Allen 2015) . However, the critique of Di-
allo’s identity claims often extends far beyond her
narrative to the ontological dismissal of transrace per
se as “not a thing” (Blay 2015) and as “sociologically
nonexistent” (Borck 2017, 684) . This shows how Di-
allo’s story has served as a particularly limited and
limiting narrative that has constrained discussions of
racial fluidity in the US. As the Afro-Jewish philo-
sopher Lewis Gordon points out, “people have been
moving fluidly through races since the concept
emerged in its prototypical form” (2018, 14) . Beyond
the case of passing for survival, Gordon cites various
other examples of racial mobility: groups such as Irish
Americans or Greek Americans “achieving white
identity,” but also individuals from these communit-
ies who followed different trajectories and became
black through socialization, or were known as black
to begin with (15) . Such collective and individual
trajectories of racial transformation have been evoked
only marginally in the debate on transracialism. Di-
allo’s extraordinary visibility, resulting in continuous
media coverage and a book contract, demonstrates
her privileged status that serves to invisibilize other
agential negotiations with race. One may object that
these other narratives do not explicitly claim transra-
cial identification, but neither did Diallo until after
her dramatic outing: initially she even distanced her-
self from the term “transracial” (Moyer 2015) .
Cressida Heyes notes that individual motivations for
changing social or legal race, particularly whether
people seek to merely pass as a different race or con-
ceptualize a different racial identity, are often unclear
in the historical record (2009, 143) . Ironically,
wholesale dismissals of transracialism and the reduc-
tion of agential racial transformation to Diallo’s
case—for instance, Borck (2017, 684) says that
transrace as a category has just one exemplar—recen-
ters her in discussions about racial fluidity and rein-
forces the privileged status of identity narratives
originating in white American contexts.
Given that the dismissal of transrace on the basis of
Diallo’s story only bolsters her representational pree-
minence, could one reframe the issue to separate the
question of her material privileges from the ontologic-
al question of transracialism? This calls for an inter-
rogation of why the distinction between subjective
identification and the materiality of social position
does not seem feasible for transrace narratives. Why
does it become so difficult to separate the critique of
Diallo’s actions from the dismissal of transrace, both
in her case and as a whole? Why does not a privilege-
identity (or materiality-subjectivity) distinction
emerge here in the way it does for gender? I do not
seek to offer a prescriptive answer to these questions.
Rather, I would seek for scholars and activists to re-
cognize that we are not simply dealing here with so-
cially determined materialities, but with a specific
condition of legibility that we ourselves help to create
for good or bad, such that the distinction between
privilege and identity becomes intelligible in certain
kinds of identity claims, but not in others.
Autological Gender and Genealogical Race
Understanding our investment in (re)producing such
a condition of legibility requires introspection about
why many of us, both POC and not, evidence such a
gut reaction against racial self-determination while
gender self-determination seems to be much easier to
accept irrespective of the (dis)privileges informing in-
dividual trans narratives. Part of the answer might lie
in the modern emergence of gender and sexuality as
expressive of psychic interiority and the truth of the
self. Heyes notes that sex, gender, and sexuality have
come to be seen as “core ontological differences at-
taching to individuals” and further, the sex-gender
distinction has repositioned gender identity as a mat-
ter of individual psychology, inner authenticity and
self-expression that might contravene social sex as-
signment (2009, 148) . Conventional cisgender epi-
stemologies of gender conflate assigned sex and
gendered essence while trans-inclusive epistemologies
challenge this conflation. Both, however, demand that
we associate sex/gender with a deeply interior identity,
recalling the argument that Foucault famously makes
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about sexuality as a truth we must confess: “sexuality
is related . . . to the obligation to tell the truth . . .
and of deciphering who one is” (1988, 16) . Even as
trans discourse refuses biological or social criteria for
gender determination, the confessional avowal of
gender as a core personal identity is perhaps the con-
dition that permits its legibility and ethico-political
validation as a self-determined reality: our gendered
sense of self-perception must mean something in
terms of the ontology of our inner being and corres-
pond with an interiorized selfhood (even if gender-
queer or agender) that demands recognition beyond
social impediments. Self-determination thus re-
deploys confessional power, reversing the cissexist
idea that sociobiological sex assignment naturally
corresponds to an essential unchangeable identity,
such that the avowal of gender as an interiorized es-
sence now becomes the basis for social sex-gender re-
cognition. This redeployment is taken to its logical
conclusion in an article by Wiley Reading in Everyday
Feminism, which argues for the recognition of gender
identity as independent of not just sexed embodiment
but also gender presentation:
I’ve let my hair grow out so long that I have to
put it in pigtails . . . I sound like a girl, right?
I’m not. Why? Because I don’t identify as one. .
. . Although gender identity and gender ex-
pression can be related . . . they don’t have to
be. . . . Gender identity is internal. . . . It’s the
word (or words) that you could use to decide
yourself that simply make sense to you. . . .
Gender identity is internal, deeply-rooted, and
a central part of many people’s senses of self.
(2014; emphasis in original)
Reading thus articulates gender identification as a de-
cisional process that should be absolutely uncon-
strained by social or material determinations but,
simultaneously, it ultimately springs from and is jus-
tified on the basis of a “deeply-rooted” individual es-
sence that the subject deciphers and confesses.
In contrast, race is linked more with collective des-
cent than individual subjectivity. Heyes observes that
race is seen to derive from ancestral inheritance and is
located within a collective genealogical narrative,
which renders racial self-determination illegible:
[M]y race does not exist only in the moment
but depends on my heritage . . . race is taken to
be inherited in a way that sex is not. The claim
that ‘I’ve always known I was really white in-
side’ is unpersuasive in part because it implic-
ates others; if one’s immediate forebears are not
white, the claim risks being unintelligible.
(2009, 143-144; emphasis in original)
Sealey argues that:
[R] ace is really about a relationship—namely, a
relationship between actual genetic ancestry . . .
and the cultural and social signification of that
ancestry . . . which then allows ancestry to
mean certain things. . . . Hence, the role and
predicative force of ancestry, in my racial iden-
tity, is not biological at all, but rather, social.
(2018, 23; emphais in original)
Sealey’s framing of race as a “social construction,” with
social italicized, “emphasizes the status quo’s relative
imperviousness to individual agency” (24) . This argu-
ment ignores how ancestry may be recoded through
individual and collective agency as well as social
transformations: for instance, one’s ancestral affili-
ation may be retrospectively mapped as white or black
in ways that contravene the racial designations of
one’s forebears (Gordon 2018, 15) . Further, despite
Sealey’s insistence that the “predicative force of ances-
try” is not biological but social, in her argument, the
social signification of inheritance ultimately references
“actual genetic ancestry” (2018, 23) . The definition of
ancestry is thus limited in terms of consanguinity over
chosen or voluntary kin, reinforcing a normative
model of lineage based on blood relations and per-
petuating hierarchies of kinship that exclude queer
arrangements of family and genealogy.
The association of race with consanguineal ancestry
means that the possibility of individualized racial
subjectivity outside of one’s “actual genetic” genealogy
may be dismissed entirely. As Blay says, “transracial
identity. . . perpetuates the false idea that it is possible
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to 'feel' a race” (2015) . The only legible and valid
form of subjective racial identity seems to hinge on
the experience of consanguineal belonging, erasing
the possibility of non-genetic affiliation with a racial-
ized collectivity. Witness Denene Millner’s explana-
tion of why Diallo can never be black: “like
diamonds, blackness is created under extreme pres-
sure and high temperature, deep down in the recesses
of one’s core. It is sitting between your mama's knees
on a Saturday night . . . It is showing up to the family
reunion” (2017) . This establishes a deterministic rela-
tionship between consanguineal heredity and subject-
ive racial identity, which may also be extended to
social position: heredity determines skin colour de-
termines racial privilege (Blay 2015) . More construc-
tionist accounts of race that do not see race as
biological may also dismiss subjective racial identific-
ation. Victoria Anderson (2017), for instance, argues
that race as a politically constructed taxonomical sys-
tem based on fallacious classifications precludes racial
identity as an “innate, inner experience” as claimed by
Diallo, but is silent on why socially constructed cat-
egories cannot be interiorized, as commonly accepted
in the case of gender.
The contrast between the individualized determina-
tion of gender and the social and/or biological de-
termination of race evokes Elizabeth Povinelli’s
analytical distinction between autology and genealogy
as the dominant forms of discipline in late liberalism
(Povinelli 2006; Posocco 2008) . Gender self-determ-
ination may be understood as a paradigmatic case of
autology, by which Povinelli refers to the discursive
construction of the autonomous, sovereign and self-
determining subject (Povinelli 2006) . Autology or-
ganizes identity based on “a fantasy of self-authorizing
freedom . . . what do I think, what do I desire, I am
what I am, I am what Iwant . . . (which is) a phant-
asmagorical figure of liberalism” (Povinelli and Di-
Fruscia 2012, 80; emphasis in original) . However, as
we saw above, the autological construction of gender
identity is justified and delimited through the opera-
tions of confessional power such that self-determina-
tion should be free ofmaterial determinations and yet
rooted in interiorized selfhood. Genealogy, on the
other hand, refers to “discourses which stress social
constraint and determination in processes of subject
constitution and construe the subject as bound by
‘various kinds of inheritances’” (Posocco 2008) .
The ways in which the lines between transrace and
transgender are drawn in contemporary debates on
transracialism, such that the materiality-subjectivity
or privilege-identity distinction operates in one do-
main but not the other, serves to police and reproduce
the autology-genealogy distinction. While the disso-
ciation of interiorized subjectivity from social sex-
gender assignment and related material (dis)privileges
in the case of gender enables the autological project of
gender self-determination, the deterministic confla-
tion of sociobiological ancestry, subjective racial iden-
tity, and racial (dis)privilege preserves race as
resolutely genealogical. The anxious desire to delimit
the valid domain of autology and maintain proper
distinctions between autology and genealogy is evid-
enced in the aforementioned contrasting statements
by Talusan. She articulates her womanhood as a con-
scious decision in the face of social contingencies,
only to later qualify transgender identity and trans-
ition as involuntary and expressive of essential self-
hood, in contradistinction to transrace which is cast
as an illegitimate exercise in autology without a deep
ontological basis: “Dolezal identified as black, but I
am a woman” (Talusan 2015) . As Reed (2015) notes,
“essentialism cuts in odd ways in this saga . . .
[s] ometimes race is real in a way that sex is not,” as an
immutable social reality based on biologized ancestry,
while sometimes “gender is ‘real’ in a way that race is
not,” as the involuntary ontological core of selfhood.
However, qualifying Reed, this is not merely “oppor-
tunist politics,” it is symptomatic of how race and
gender are constructed and situated differently with
respect to autological and genealogical discourses and
modalities of power.
The contrast between the individualized autology of
gender and the collective genealogy of race thus might
be one of the underlying reasons for the widespread
discomfort with transracialism and the race-gender
analogy. If the fantasy of autological gender identity
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disguises the operations of confessional power, such
autology is constituted and delimited through its dis-
tinction from genealogical aspects of selfhood.
Whether transracialism is an ethically or ontologically
valid phenomenon or not, the separation of autolo-
gical and genealogical domains of identity ties us to
the oppressive generalization of gender as an inevit-
able “deeply-rooted” essence that we must decipher
and confess, in contradistinction to race or ethnicity
that is assigned to us or derives from our inherited
collective positions. The autology-genealogy separa-
tion as applied to race and gender thus works as a
disciplinary mechanism through which the subject is
constituted within contemporary forms of gov-
ernance: it ties one to confessional technologies of
power in certain aspects of selfhood and to sociobio-
logical inheritance in other aspects.
Inasmuch as many of us derive pleasure or validation
from ontological identification, I am not asking for
doing away with the autology of gender self-determ-
ination as merely a ruse of power. Indeed, the very
emergence of this autological discourse marks hard-
won struggles against the genealogical regulation of
assigned sex-gender. Nor is this an argument for the
indiscriminate extension of autology to all domains
of identity. I end with the rather more humble pro-
posal that we become more reflexive about how and
why we disentangle subjective identity from material
difference and social position in some cases but not
others, and how our inconsistent usages of the mater-
iality-subjectivity distinction reinforce or reconfigure
the governmental demarcation of selfhood into auto-
logical and genealogical domains. More reflexive uses
of the materiality-subjectivity distinction could help
us understand the variable and sometimes contradict-
ory imbrications of identification and social position-
ing for both gender and race. Such reflexivity might
enable a more contextualized approach to contradict-
ory alignments of material position and subjective
identification and allow for a more transparent ac-
counting of why scholars and activists may be more
accepting of some such identity claims than others,
rather than the generalized adjudication of subject
positions as per a preset autology/genealogy divide
that consigns certain axes of identity to the autologic-
al fantasy of self-determination and others to genea-
logical constraints. Critiques of privileged forms of
gender and racial (dis) identification might then also
avoid the adjudication of their relative degree of on-
tological realness or validity, which is perhaps ulti-
mately undecidable.
Endnote
1 . I use “transrace” instead of the more usual adjective
“transracial” in order to disambiguate my usage from
the sense of “transracial” as pertaining to cross-racial
adoptees (see Moyer 2015) .
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